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Plato’s Validation
of Heterosexuality
in Symposium

Joseph Schwartz,
Rowan University
In Plato’s Symposium, the subject of homoeroticism and the
relationships between ‘boyfriends’ and ‘lovers’ are discussed in
detail. In the speeches of Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Aristophanes,
this type of relationship is seen not only as natural, but also
superior to heterosexual relationships. However, one can say that
Plato, by using the dialogue of Socrates and Diotima, undermines
the institution of homosexuality and the validity of the ‘boyfriend’
and’lover’ relationship as having a purer and superior form of love
than in heterosexual relationships while elevating the latter to an
equal status.
Excluding Socrates, the other members of the symposium
frequently use the example of a relationship between two men.
Phaedrus shows the power of love using the example of an army
comprised of lovers and boyfriends. However, in this example,
the relationship is not strictly defined by the practice of pederasty,
but rather by the strong emotions of a man for his elder.
It is in Pausanias’ speech that the audience first becomes
aware of the idea of two types of love: Common Aphrodite, born
from Zeus and Dione; and Celestial Aphrodite, conceived from the
male god Uranus. The rationale for the classification of each seems
to stem from the idea that the conception of Aphrodite between a
male and female presence is much more natural and terrestrial in
occurrence than the birth of Aphrodite from the severed member
of a male god. Therefore, this bolsters the idea of male-male
sexuality as celestial since it is through a male alone that Celestial
Aphrodite is conceived.
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Aristophanes’ humorous story of creation puts forward an
idea of homosexuality as a natural and purer form of love, in
comparison to heterosexuality. He explains it using the idea that
every person was a half of a larger being made up of two humans.
These creatures were male-male, female-female, or male-female
and were split in half as punishment from Zeus. According to
Aristophanes, every human wishes to return to his or her other
half. The originally male-female creatures were attracted to any
member of the opposite sex, and are usually adulterers; while the
male-male and female-female beings were in search of their true
same-sex other half. When they find their other half, they desire to
be one with that person again in order to be whole. This is the
definition that Aristophanes gives to love: “the pursuit of
wholeness.”1
Here, it seems that Plato is again reinforcing the idea of
homosexuality as purer than heterosexuality. However, in this
claim, Plato also shows a weakness in Aristophanes’ argument in
that he does not defend it with any practical reason or rationale.
He also does not explain why the quest for a homosexual person’s
“wholeness” is more divine than that of a heterosexual
individual’s. Therefore, though the presentation and content of
the story is amusing, it does little to strengthen the logical
validation of homosexuality, while still taking time to criticize
heterosexual relationships.
The speeches of Eryximachus and Agathon deal less with
the gender roles that love tends to follow and focus more on the
idea of love as an objective concept. Eryximachus, a physician,
approaches the issue in a way that explains how love interacts
with the human body. Agathon, who is being honored at this
party for his prize-winning plays, concentrates on the actual god
Love, who is described in masculine terms and only affects males.
The members of the symposium oppose each other in
different ways. Most try to defend the idea of homoeroticism by
praising the concept of the ‘lover’ and ‘boyfriend’ relationship, but
do not succeed in rendering their arguments irrefutable. Another
manner in which they try to validate homosexuality is through
their attempts to discredit heterosexual relationships by either
referring to them as “common” (as is seen in Pausanias’s speech)
or crediting them with adultery (mentioned in Aristophanes’
speech). The discussion is driven by the merits of the different
types of love, rather than the idea of love that is later explained by
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Diotima through Socrates. As a result of Socrates’s speech, the
speakers are shown to be unable to defend their definitions of love
due to their lack of logical reasoning and the superficial thinking
presented in their dialogues, which discredits the views and
opinions held by those individuals.
Socrates’ speech is considered the climax of the symposium
and therefore the most anticipated. The fact that he immediately
introduces the female aspect in the guise of Diotima, a factor that
the other speakers ignored, seems to be intended to weaken the
foundations of the previous speeches. Socrates vouches for her
credibility by addressing her as being an “expert in love, as well as
in a large number of other areas too.”2 With Diotima comes the
introduction of a new concept of love. This definition follows the
idea of different levels, starting with the love of one particular
body (in this case a male body) and ascending to the highest level,
that of the love of beauty in its purest form. It is this highest form,
according to Diotima (and therefore Socrates) that all individuals
should strive for, but only the enlightened will achieve.
Since it is Diotima who teaches Socrates about the purest
type of love, it becomes clear that this type, the love of beauty in its
purest form, can also be explained and experienced by a woman.
However, Plato is subversive in the manner in which he uses
Diotima’s presence to refute the speeches of the others attending
the party. He carefully has her speak in male terms referring to an
individual experiencing celestial love as “he.”3 However, he adds
a specifically female aspect to the idea of love, one that makes for
the strongest argument for Plato’s validation: the idea of
pregnancy.
By using the idea of pregnancy in her explanation, Diotima
incorporates an exclusively female aspect to the concept of love.
The lack of a male’s ability to become pregnant in the scientific
sense of the word requires a need to add a female presence in the
definition of love. When this occurs, according to Gregory Vlastos,
“Diotima undertakes to state the most general condition which the
pursuit of Beauty has to meet to qualify as eros, her phrase, ‘birth
in beauty’ is all to patently a generalization of the procreative –
hence necessarily heterosexual – love.”4 By doing this, Plato draws
a parallel between “common” and “celestial” love. Both types of
love are aimed toward the same goal of immortality and the desire
to create or continue “beauty,” yet the method of achieving these
goals differ. This is best explained by Margalit Finkelberg when
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she speaks of the idea of pregnancy in the Symposium saying,
“Owing to this offspring, the spiritual parent partakes in
immortality, just as the bodily parent does by bearing real
children.”5
Diotima’s definition of physical pregnancy is exclusive to
heterosexual relationships, yet in her definition of mental
pregnancy she switches from using strictly male identifiers, such
as “he” and “his,” to more ambiguous ones such as “someone” or
“a person.” At one point she comments on the idea of mental
offspring saying, “We’d all prefer to have children of this sort
rather than the human kind.”6 By using the ambiguous term
“we’d,” Diotima, and therefore Plato, is expressing that the desire
of what Pausanias would call “celestial love” is felt by both men
and women. In his studies, David Halperin has commented on the
ambiguity of Diotima’s language by stating that she has created
“delineation of a peculiar type of eroticism (pregnancy) in which
the distinction between sexual and reproductive functions has
been totally abolished.”7 As a result of this interesting use of
language and intentional blurring of gender roles, it seems as if
what is possible for men in the area of love is also possible for
women and vice versa. Halperin goes on to say, “The two strands
of sex and reproduction are so thoroughly interwoven in Diotima’s
discourse that they are virtually impossible to disentangle.”8
Using this rationale, it could be said that if women are capable of
feeling and desiring “celestial love” which, according to Diotima,
is simply the love of beauty in its purest form, then the
relationship between a man and woman can be considered equal
in its purity to that of a lover and his boyfriend.
Also, when one compares Diotima’s/Socrates’s view of the
purest form of love, it can be said that no other speaker in the
Symposium has been able to transcend past its lower forms. That is,
the speeches of the other speakers are more focused on the
physical act rather than the transcendent concept. Through the
mingling of heterosexual ideas and ambiguous terminology,
Diotima is able to create a love in which both orientations have
equal validity. This, in turn, questions the opinions held by the
other speakers that the boyfriend/ lover relationship is superior to
a heterosexual relationship due to the fact that each is still steeped
in the physical.
Another way that Plato can be seen as undermining the
homoerotic ideal of the time would be the fact that he exempts
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Socrates from having any physical relationships with men. The
fact that Diotima is a woman rules out the possibility that he
acquired his knowledge of the subject from a male lover. His
interactions with Alcibiades and the account that Alcibiades gives
of his encounters with Socrates, also allows one to infer that
Socrates is not interested in the male body, but more so the
transcendent idea of beauty.
Alcibiades states that several times he tries to seduce
Socrates by getting them to be alone together, going to the
gymnasium, or keeping him at his house. However, each time
Socrates ignores his advances until Alcibiades is finally able to
spend a night with him. Yet, even after all of his attempts he states
that his night with Socrates was as if he had “been sleeping with
[his] father or an elder brother.”9 While Alcibiades is somewhat
insulted by this encounter he also marvels at Socrates’ character
and self-control. It can be said that what Plato is trying to
accomplish here is to show that even though Socrates admires and
appreciates Alcibiades’ physical beauty, he does not need to act on
it by having a homosexual relationship; by doing so, he shows the
purist and highest level of love.
When one compares the relationship between Diotima and
Socrates with that of Socrates and Alcibiades, there arises another
of Plato’s attempts to discredit the idea of the paederastic
relationship. The relationship between Diotima and Socrates can
be viewed as the kind of “celestial” love that was described by
Pausanias earlier in the Symposium. However, unlike Pausanias’
definition, this type of love is occurring between a man and a
woman, without any physical relation being consummated. The
relationship of Socrates and Alcibiades, on the other hand can be
seen as Alcibiades physically pursuing Socrates. This view can be
supported by Alcibiades’ constant attempts to get Socrates alone in
order to have a sexual relationship with him. Therefore, according
to Pausanias, this type of love would be considered “common
love” and expected to occur between a man and woman.
Accordingly, as expressed by Christine Allen, if this interaction is
being used to express Plato’s view of homosexuality, “then it
becomes clear that his main concern is to elevate love above the
sexual level rather than to compare male homosexuality with
heterosexuality.”10 As a result, Plato further defends the idea that
heterosexual love is equal to that of homosexual love by holding
each one to the same standard, regardless of individual
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orientation.
It should not be said that Plato was necessarily trying to
dissuade the entire practice of homosexuality when writing
Symposium. However, it does seem that Plato was trying to give
validity to heterosexual relationships and discredit the idea that
homoerotic relations were superior. By making Socrates, who was
considered the base of knowledge at the time, explain love as
being an ambiguous idea that transcends the body, and therefore
gender, he was able to achieve this point. This point was furthered
by his interactions between Diotima, compared to Alcibiades.
By giving heterosexual characteristics to Socrates and
emphasizing his lack of physical homoerotic desire (both of which
are present in the other orators), Plato gives greater credit to the
idea of a nonphysical love. Socrates, the oldest and wisest of the
speakers, does not indulge in physical homosexual relationships,
but is still able to appreciate an individual for his or her mind.
Therefore, Plato shows how it is possible to love the mind of a man
(or woman), without the necessity of loving the body.
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